

The “Defenders of Security”– Stefanie van de Kerkhof  
Transnational Images of European Weapon Producers in the Cold War

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What do you think and feel if you’re surrounded by soldiers with loaded weapons? If you see tanks, bombers or other huge weapon systems do you feel secure and comfortable? Does an atomic shield instil a feeling of well-being in you? Do you have a feeling of protection and trust if you think of the space systems which might control each single one of us? I’m not quite sure if all of you negate these questions, but I expect you at least to be irritated by them. Why do we – as citizens, tax-payers and human beings – feel secure if we are surrounded by deadly technology, which is capable of wiping out human life on earth?

Hence, this paper is interested in the feeling of security and protection and how it was constructed in the Cold War. Therefore I focus on powerful and dominant actors in the area of governmental discourse: the European Weapon Producers. I want to demonstrate European Cold War Cultures in a special field of image-creation and symbolic representation: the marketing and sales strategies of corporations like Rheinmetall, Krupp and Diehl (Germany), Le Creusot (France) and BAD (Great-Britain). These corporations – some of them grew into huge conglomerates in the Cold War Era – create an image of themselves as “defenders of security”, of their products as “reliable friends” and of their advantageous technological knowledge. The transnational focus allows to differentiate between countries and sectors like tank, aeroplane and ammunition producers. With this interdisciplinary economic and cultural approach I intend to contribute to a “New Cultural Business History”, which focuses not only on economic and statistical aspects of the enterprise, but also on the cultural field of imagery and discourse.

As scholars like Richard Alan Schwartz, Scott C. Zeman, Jerome F. Shapiro and Stephen J. Whitfield have shown in recent publications for the United States, the Cold War shaped cultural and social phenomena in the fields of fine arts, media, literature and in the spheres of images, discourses and memories.<sup>1</sup> How this process influenced war or peace cultures in Eastern and Western Europe have yet not been researched sufficiently.<sup>2</sup>

Nearly at the same time, the creation of a specific image of the corporation, brands and products has become ever more important for companies in the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as business historians have pointed out. The development of business strategies reached the point that brands, products and logos serve as shorthand to summarise and understand the nature and history of economic actors which are thus abbreviated. The different functions and

intentions behind the marketing and advertising vary from basic sales technique over sophisticated branding to political manoeuvring.

Besides images of high technology, economic development and dominant virility, there were two main fields of discourse, on which marketing strategies of firms like Rheinmetall focussed: security and trust.<sup>3</sup> As Eckart Conze, Arnold Sywottek, Lothar Brock and others have shown the dominant „security“-discourse can be used even as an interdisciplinary paradigm for West German history after 1945. This convincing concept is useful to combine modern political analysis with transnational and socio-economic aspects – neglecting the limitations of administrative or governmental changes.<sup>4</sup>

By using this concept I intend to underline the cultural and media based dimensions of the Cold War. It should become clear, that the mentioned companies in Germany, France and Great Britain used techniques of discourse framing for their marketing strategies, and that history played an important role for their argumentation. My proposal is part of a broader research project focussing on the marketing strategies of European weapon producers in the Cold War. For the first time, weapon producers like Rheinmetall in Germany have opened their archives for contemporary historical research.

Business historians and economists have shown in recent publications that the creation of a corporate image has become ever more important for firms in the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>5</sup> What does this mean for weapon and arms producing enterprises, which are highly bound to a specific market structure? In examining this question, I shall first look at the general structure of the different markets for weapons and military goods. In which way does the structure of the national and latter international arms trade influence the distribution and marketing strategies of European weapon producers like Krupp, Rheinmetall or others? This chapter (pp. 3-5) serves as a general introduction to the field of arms markets. In the second part of my paper, I shall look at the different marketing strategies of these firms, which use national fairs and international expositions as well as special forms of event marketing. These special case studies in the field of marketing lead me to the creation of national, transnational or global images of the corporations. I shall look at the brands, logos and advertising campaigns which are designed and used in specific manners. In which way do the visual cultures of European weapon producers create an image of security, trust and protection?<sup>6</sup>

### **1. The European Arms Market in the Cold War**

The structure of the European arms market as a whole and the German arms market in particular is difficult to describe, because it depends on one's definition of the whole sector.

There are no German statistics which collect data about a weapon or an arms industry. In contrast to other European states like Great Britain, Italy and France, but also to the USA, there is also no special association or lobby group. Instead there are many different lobbying associations such as “*Wehrtechnischer Ausschuß des Bundesverband Deutscher Industrie*”, “*Bundesverband der Deutschen Luft- und Raumfahrtindustrie*” or “*Verband Deutscher Schiffbauer*”.<sup>7</sup> The first fundamental study of the sector in Germany is an overview from two political scientists, Zdrowomyslaw and Bontrup. According to them, it is possible, on the one hand in a broader perspective to speak about the military relevance and influences of military suppliers for the whole economy.<sup>8</sup> Many products of this “defence sector” have a dual-use-character – civil or military – like airplanes or electronic systems, which makes a clear specification difficult. On the other hand, a more narrow definition of “arms industry” would only contain phenomena of a pure weapon-production i.e. tanks, guns, ammunition, bomber. I will concentrate on this focus in my paper, because the narrow definition also includes a great variety of industries, such as aerospace and shipbuilding industries, weapon producers, producers of military vehicles, of ammunition and explosives. Certainly, these kinds of arms producing enterprises belong to the producer goods industry rather than to the consumer goods industry.<sup>9</sup>

Hartwig Hummel has shown us, that in the FRG there are typically two kinds of arms producing enterprises: the family or state financed special firm or the huge conglomerate under control of big concerns.<sup>10</sup> Often business historians have underestimated the role of weapon production in large-scale enterprises of this sector, which have recently been researched, such as Krupp.<sup>11</sup> In certain years German weapon producers have reached a high percentage of military production, but altogether the degree of military dependency changes over time.<sup>12</sup>

This problem presents a great difficulty for historians regarding enterprises which have no clearly defined military character of production. Difficulties often arise due to unclear boundaries between civil and military production. For the majority of modern weapon systems it is a fact that they are dependent on a great variety of main contractors and other suppliers, which, to a large extent, produce civilian goods. Hence the historical sources and materials in the business archives are also problematic, because descriptions of the later use are often lacking. A good example are the producers of tank steel, which haven't marked in their statistics whether their steel is used for civilian or military purposes.<sup>13</sup>

Economists often consider only highly abstracted and aggregated empirical data, concentrating on readily available statistics of governmental military or defence expenditures.

These expenditures in relation to other indicators like per capita-income, gross national product or education expenditures should mark the dimensions of the military sector for the whole economy or society.<sup>14</sup> For German historical research the dictum of Michael Geyer is still valid: „Insbesondere die Geschichte der Rüstungsindustrie, ganz zu schweigen von der Geschichte der Forschung und Entwicklung, aber auch der personellen Rüstung ist noch nicht geschrieben.“<sup>15</sup> It lacks especially on market analyses, enterprise studies, historical research on the international distribution and the arms trade development, as well as with the economic base of firms.<sup>16</sup> Theoretical and methodological aspects are far more concerned in anglo-american studies, such as technological spin-offs, rentability of military procurement and of the structure of arms trade.<sup>17</sup> In addition to economic studies the far reaching, intense research performance of the *Military-Industrial-Complex-Concept* should be mentioned, which dealt with the connections between politicians, lobbyists, managers, scientists and high-rank military.<sup>18</sup> Topics which still haven't been the focus of German and European historical research on war and military.<sup>19</sup>

Not only from an political point of view, but also from an economic perspective the arms market is a very special one. It's structure is rather monopsonistic, because of the state often being the most important contractor with several personal linkages. Sometimes it's even oligo-, dyo- or tripolistic, because of smaller enterprises and big business trying to increase their sales by selling their weapons to other nations and governments. Prices are not only fixed by market forces (supply and demand), but depend also on governmental regulation of the arms market.<sup>20</sup> This regulation also plays a role for the producing branches and bases, because strategic security is a main factor in the enterprises choice of location, which has recently become an important theme for urban historians.<sup>21</sup> With regard to an institutional approach, the arms industry is also a very special sector. The property rights are much more tied to the nation-building processes and developments than in other sectors. In Germany arms manufacturing was as much induced by the state as was the industrial production. In the case of war-economies or war-like economies (B. Carroll) a governmental regulation, that tries to install public enterprises instead of private firms, has been observed.<sup>22</sup> These changes in the market structure have even been observed in the American economy after 1945. Because of the permanent conflict with the SU in the aftermath of World War II a restructuring of the arms industry has taken place. The Cold War rivalry between the two "Super powers" and their allies caused an arms race with special implications for the concerned enterprises. In the USA a system of competition for the arms industry was refused in favour of a widely regulated market structure. A competition for governmental arms

contracts became more and more unnecessary due to the technological development. Rivalries were limited to the main contractors, which tried vigorously to obtain contracts for huge research- and development-programs. These contracts were of a special type, which guaranteed further expansion (cost-plus-contracts). Because of the high speed of changing innovation-cycles – especially in the case of the aerospace industries – there had to be a guarantee for the contractors investments, for the permanent technological development and of the military demands (follow-on-imperative).<sup>23</sup> These developments of the market structure aren't sufficiently examined for the German and European instances yet. For the West German arms industry after World War II a great expansion of the public contracts and several linkages between the military and industrial sector can be shown in marketing reports at Rheinmetall.<sup>24</sup> Whereas the arms exports stagnated up to the Vietnam War, there has been a significant increase since the late 1970s.<sup>25</sup> For consumption in general, it has been pointed out that in the 1950s/1960s there was a transition from a sales to a buyers market.<sup>26</sup> The question of this transition hasn't been decided yet for the economic recovery of the arms industry after World War II. Researchers of the SIPRI spoke of a transition into buyers markets in the 1980s concerning the international arms industry.<sup>27</sup> This may be the reason for the remarkable efforts to cooperate in NATO- and European-countries, especially in the aircraft, engine, and shipbuilding industries.<sup>28</sup>

In contrast to the continuous production in France, Great-Britain and other European countries, the recovery process of the German arms industry in the post-war era started in the 1950s. This development was linked to the international developments towards a Cold War, because after the Korean War and the "Deutschlandvertrag" the FRG joined the NATO and began to rebuild its military force.<sup>29</sup> The first German military forces after WW II were built up in spring 1955 and tank-contracts for the Suisse enterprise Hispano Suiza were signed. The reason for these contracts of the German *Bundesministerium der Verteidigung* with an international firm was the lack of technological knowledge and industrial power of the German industry. But only five years later the recovery of the German arms industry had displaced the international competitors. Despite the *Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung* being the main contractor for private arms producers in Germany, there's still a huge amount of investment which goes into marketing and sales activities of the arms industry. Marketing not only for the distribution of weapons but also for advertising campaigns to reach a wider audience seems to be of great importance.

## **2. Marketing Strategies**

In contrast to the anglo-american research there is a lack of intense research on the history of marketing and consumption in Germany. German economic historians have similar to their colleagues from cultural studies just begun to close the gap to the international research.<sup>30</sup>

In my paper it should become obvious, that continuing research on the history of consumption especially in the field of marketing has to differentiate between the consumer goods industry on the one hand and the producer goods industry on the other hand. As economists have pointed out, not only the machinery industry, but also the producer goods industry as a whole has to follow other marketing strategies as the consumer goods industry.<sup>31</sup> For the communication politics of the producer goods industry the personal sales negotiations play a dominant role, because of the complex and technically ambitious kinds of products. For these kind of negotiations the firms need to have a specialised form of consumer or retailer communication. Direct or indirect instruments supporting the sales policy in this regard are: prospects, catalogues, references, sales books, advertising materials like brochures, leaflets, articles, photographs and films, feasibility studies, and free gifts. But of much more importance are personal communicative instruments like trainings, factory tours, events, fairs, expositions and special meetings. Advertisements in expert journals and newspapers have as well as any kind of Public Relations a supporting role for the communication policy. Direct forms of distribution policy like negotiations with engineers and top managers are much more relevant than in other sectors, because of the character of the products.<sup>32</sup> Let's start with the participation of arms producers at fairs and exhibitions.

### **2.1. The Early Iconography of Weapons presented at Fairs and Exhibitions**

Arms producers very early developed their own forms of weapon presentation and representation. Special events and the evolving fairs and exhibitions were used to create a specific image of arms producers and their products.<sup>33</sup> But hence, what was to serve as a marketing instrument only has become an important arena to create and present the iconography of arms and weapons.

The sales instrument of commercial and industrial fairs was developed in France, so that as well as in the field of advertisement the French government and enterprises can be seen as marketing pioneers. In historical literature the French National Fair of 1798 is regarded as the first industrial fair in general. An important argument for the organisers was the national one: the fair should demonstrate the force of the French nation against the enemy Great-Britain. "Nos manufactures sont les arsenaux d'où doivent sortir les armes des plus funestes à la

puissance britannique”, as the promoters wrote after the Parisian exhibition which fittingly took place on the « *Champ de Mars* ». <sup>34</sup> The German fairs in the 19th and early 20th century were like their predecessors in France a presentation of both German modernism and German patriotism. They reflected the paradigm of economic growth and development. Their symbolic function for the evolving publicity was – like other bourgeois parties for the political awareness – to unify the German economic nation and to demonstrate the superiority of the German culture. <sup>35</sup>

Krupp was one of the most important industrialists who soon discovered the industrial fairs as an important institution for his enterprise in regard to advertisement for his high-quality and reliable products, image-creation and networking. <sup>36</sup> Krupp exhibited not only his cannons in the shape of a castle, but also the social achievements of his workers. <sup>37</sup> In 1844 and 1854 he presented cannons, guns made of cast iron as well as raw material for another weapon producer. Beside the product presentation Krupp developed different forms of advertising materials such as price listings, leaflets and a book with articles on the social activities of the firm. Altogether it was a great success for Krupp, especially the cannons and the railroad articles were mentioned in several newspaper articles. Wolbring thought that Krupp presented the weapons not because of his production range, but because weapons got more attention and public resonance in Prussia than other products. <sup>38</sup> Perhaps it was the high level of attention, which led Krupp to the conclusion to present more of these products at international expositions.

Research on the history of the World Expositions with cultural methods, taking older publications of English and German technical and social historians into consideration, has shown an enormous increase in recent years. <sup>39</sup> But according to Christoph Cornelissen a far-reaching interdisciplinary study is still missing. <sup>40</sup> The role of these exposition, like other fairs for the weapon and arms producing industries has not been carefully researched either. But for the development of the private German arms industry it is quite clear, that the world expositions were of tremendous importance. In the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century nearly all important producers of arms exhibited their products, mostly in prominent places. <sup>41</sup> Wolbring showed thoroughly that in the case of the world expositions and later in the field of public relation it was Krupp, who was an early adopter of new means of mass media. He endeavoured to expand sales of his products and to transport a sense of the firms well-known status and reputation onto the public sphere. <sup>42</sup> At the first World Exposition in London in 1851, Krupp presented both civilian and military products in order to transport a specific image of his firm.

The exhibition of a huge cannon was carefully arranged and implemented with military symbols of the Prussian Army. It had a very strong resonance in noble circles as well as in newspapers and journals.<sup>43</sup> This was the result of a well organised and strategically designed enactment. Wolbring thought that Krupp used the public only as a communicative vehicle to convince his targeted consumers, the important emperors and highly decorated militaries. Through this vehicle Krupp built up an image of quality, solidity, technical perfectionism, patriotism and modernity in combination with a far reaching understanding of innovation.<sup>44</sup> The successful first World Exposition became a model for later Krupp appearances on the international scene. The image he created each time by presenting the biggest cannon in the world did not change at all. This thesis is still true concerning expositions after 1945, which showed a different kind of national identity. After World War II the specialization and development of the fair sector brought about a completely different kind of world exposition. Hence, the last presentation of German weapons at a world exposition took place in Brussels in 1958.<sup>45</sup>

## **2.2 Industrial Fairs or Expositions of special interest in the Cold War Era**

After World War II there was an important change in the international fair system: highly specialised industrial fairs or expositions became the most important instruments to develop the market for weapons and arms systems. Not only fairs for direct consumers or retailers, but also expositions with a special theme for consumers, scientists, governmental contractors, lobbyists and a wider audience. These fairs and expositions often have a focus on information and communication rather than on direct sales. Therefore it is difficult to differentiate whether they are fairs or expositions.<sup>46</sup> Since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century there existed a few special expositions for weapon producers. Such as the international aerospace fairs in France (Le Bourget), Great-Britain (Farnborough) or Germany (Internationale Luft- und Raumfahrt ausstellung, ILA) or the later fairs for electronic systems like the Eurosatory Rüstungselektronik at Le Bourget (Paris).<sup>47</sup>

The first special German exposition for civilian and military airplanes, the ILA, took place in Frankfurt (Main) in 1909. Later expositions evolved in content and range, which led to the move of the ILA to the Berlin-Charlottenburg fair-grounds in 1928. From 1955 to 1990 this exposition took place every two years in Hannover-Langenhagen. The year 1992 saw the return to Berlin, to the Schönefeld airfield, where ILA took place five times, the last one from the 6<sup>th</sup> to 12<sup>th</sup> June 2000.<sup>48</sup> Several ILA-fairs were co-organized with the German aerospace association, the *Deutscher Verband für Luft- und Raumfahrt*. It is not clear, in which ways the

association influenced the concept and content of the ILA. Claus H. Boerner from the top association of the German fairs and expositions (*Ausstellungs- und Messe-Ausschuß der Deutschen Wirtschaft e.V., AUMA*) judged concerning the general role of associations and lobby-groups in Germany: „Bei anderen Messen und Fachgesellschaften wiederum treten Wirtschaftsverbände als Mitveranstalter neben den Messegesellschaften auf oder gewähren aktive Unterstützung als ideelle Träger. Daß damit immer eine weitgehende bis gänzliche Bestimmung der Veranstaltungsmodalitäten einhergeht, liegt auf der Hand“.<sup>49</sup>

Not only regarding this instance, but also concerning the role of the German federal and regional governments further research is needed as well. It is a fact, that over the years a large amount of public subsidies were spent on this industrial fair. In 1998 nearly half of the costs were financed with public means (6 Mio. DM). It was the only fair subsidised by the federal government, in 1998 with an amount of 1 million DM. The following expositions in the years 2002 and 2004 presented a similar image, but the cost for the German Bundesländer Berlin and Brandenburg doubled as did the total costs.<sup>50</sup> The public spending was intended to give the exposition an image of „The Leading European Fair for the Aerospace Industries“<sup>51</sup>, which is reflected by a tremendous amount of contracts signed at the fair (for over 10 Billions of DM).<sup>52</sup>

All ILA fairs presented us – like the exhibited products – an ambivalent dual-use-character. On the one hand it is a mass event and exposition on the other hand it is an important industrial trade fair for the exhibiting enterprises.<sup>53</sup> The public interest is enormous: at the ILA `98 over 200.000 visitors were counted, most of them with a military interest.<sup>54</sup> There were air- and airstunt-shows of fighter planes, there were special exhibitions e.g. the historical exhibition “50 Years of Berlin Air Bridge” and a huge space exhibition. The industrial fair on the other hand is built on three main topics. First, the exhibitions of enterprises (in 1998 300 aeroplanes, nearly 30% for military use)<sup>55</sup>, second, non-public conferences and third, a center for east-west-relations as a special trademark, „Markenzeichen der ILA“<sup>56</sup>. Many questions are left open concerning the still neglected role of special weapon fairs like the ILA: Why are such fairs of special interest installed and financed by the public hand? Why is such a huge public event for the mass visitors planned and implemented? Which special forms of direct and indirect marketing and communication policy are used? In which way do these fairs represent marketing as a far-reaching communicative and social strategy and influence public discourse?<sup>57</sup>

### 2.3 Event Marketing as a trust-building instrument

Besides these national, international and special exhibitions and fairs there is one other form of organised personal sales technique: event marketing. As in the case of the world expositions it was Krupp who was a German pioneer in the field of event marketing. It began with the visits of the Kaiser, the Zar and other European and Asian emperors and in the end a wider range of events was organised like weapon testings, ship baptisms, and reunions with interested high-rank militaries.<sup>58</sup> These numerous special events were photographed and the memorial albums were given as a free gift to the participants and consumers. For the organisation of these memorials a special department was founded at the Krupp works in Essen, the *Photographische Abteilung*, which later became the *Graphische Anstalt*. This modern form of consumer communication was improved over time and was still used after World War II as one can see in many photographs and adverts.<sup>59</sup>

The image, which should be conveyed, was the same as at the World Expositions and industrial fairs: Krupp as a modern, innovative and trustworthy enterprise, Krupp as a socially responsible firm, Krupp as a clean, natural and ecological mill, and the products should represent the superiority of the corporation as well as the power and force. But for Krupp himself it was important that war and aggression were neglected on the photographs. This was a modern and still used form in the iconography of arms presentation.<sup>60</sup> Rheinmetall and other arms producers could refer to this form of public relations policy after World War II.

For the 65th birthday of Otto Paul Caesar, the leading director of the Rheinmetall Berlin AG, a spectacular memorial album was designed and produced by his staff in September 1971. In addition to several newspaper articles from the early days of recovery after World War II and a chronicle of the 1950s and the 1960s, the album presented numerous photographs of visits and events organised and sponsored by Rheinmetall. High rank militaries from the German Bundeswehr visited Rheinmetall in the 1960s: the German Minister of Defence Franz Josef Strauß and his staff, members of the defence committee of the German Bundestag, German diplomacy and local politicians. Along with the West-German integration in the NATO and the military aid to developing countries the number of international visitors rose. Most prominent visitors in the 1960s were Brigadier General Alfred M. Santos from the Philippines, high-rank militaries from Turkey, visitors from Ethiopia, Nigeria, Thailand, Iran and Pakistan. Several events like weapon presentations and dinners were organized for the interested customers.<sup>61</sup> Those events for the foreign militaries have to be seen in the light of military aid as a kind of development policy for countries in Asia, Africa and South America.<sup>62</sup> But

behind the ideas of human development one can guess the main intention of the Cold Warriors: to stabilize fragile nations against communist or socialist influences and ideas.<sup>63</sup>

### **3. Transnational Images of the Corporation**

#### **3.1. Brands and Logos**

The development of modern business strategies reached the point that brands, trademarks and logos serve as shorthand to summarise and understand the nature and history of the economic actors which are thus abbreviated. The different functions and intentions behind the marketing strategies and thus the advertising and communication policy vary from basic sales technique over sophisticated branding to political and transnational cultural manoeuvring which can be demonstrated by two case studies of Krupp and Rheinmetall.

##### **a) Krupp as a first-mover in corporate imagery**

The history of marketing and advertisement began late for most of the German companies as one can see in the case of Krupp. Until 1870 there existed no advertisement department existed in German industrial enterprises. Dirk Reinhardt, Fritz Blaich, Jürgen Kocka and others have pointed out that this was the result of a long term fixation on production rather than on distribution. Entrepreneurs tried to convince consumers or contractors with the quality and price of products. Change came with the *Gründerkrise*.<sup>64</sup> Representatives of the heavy industry followed the example of drugstores and warehouses to win a greater public for their products and make not only consumers, but the German public in general familiar with the high quality of their products and the technological standards of their production.

One of the first movers was Alfred Krupp.<sup>65</sup> The emphasis of the Krupp media politics was placed on articles designed to inform, impress and influence the consumers of the products rather than the wider public.<sup>66</sup> The press as a designer of public opinion was to be kept out of the firms politics and consumer-relations in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>67</sup> Of greater importance for these relations were reports in expert journals like “Militär-Wochenblatt“, „Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung“, „Zeitschrift des Vereins für das Eisenhüttenwesen“, and „Eisenbahn Zeitung“. In 1866 Alfred Krupp drastically changed his politics towards the mass media. He decided to introduce several steps towards an active media policy. Important arguments for the consumers and against his competitors should be underlined in newspaper articles, such as quality, accuracy, durability, technical advantages.<sup>68</sup> Wolbring judged this form of media politics to be a first step towards modern public relations and Corporate Image-creation. Krupp can be seen as pioneer in this field, despite his severe reserve against any kind of “*Reclame*”, which led to several steps backward concerning active marketing forms.<sup>69</sup>

Another example of Krupp media politics demonstrates a special form of modern public relations which was introduced at the Krupp works before the founding of the German Kaiserreich. In 1870 Krupp derived a plan to hire a writer, especially for the press influence and for public relations.<sup>70</sup> This writer worked in the field of press evaluation and purposeful press information for Krupp until 1920.<sup>71</sup> An example which Rheinmetall followed in the Cold War in slightly modified forms: “friendly” journalists of the high quality press and of important TV-shows were invited by the company, got more information and sometimes even small gifts. The main intention was to build up a “climate of trust”.<sup>72</sup>

Like Krupp in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century Rheinmetall began to rebuilt it’s media department in the 1960s. Krupp already had a special department which is called ‚Nachrichtenbureau’, news department, in 1890.<sup>73</sup> For this department the development of adverts was less important than the evaluation of the press and the organisation of visitors tours through the company. But as the unit grew advertisement became more important.<sup>74</sup> Not until the end of World War I and the following years of Americanisation in the advertisement sector was a real advertisement department installed at Krupp.<sup>75</sup> In the 1920s Krupp turned to a new strategic direction and followed the example of the trademark article industry. In this sector advertisement units were installed earlier, influenced by America and especially by creative professionals who had worked in the USA such as Hans Domizlaff and Paul E. Sohm.<sup>76</sup> Krupp built up his advertisement department in 1921, starting after the war to address the difficulties of sales in civilian markets. Different means of advertising were developed such as photographs, films, articles, lists of references and leaflets were created to expand on both, civilian and military markets.<sup>77</sup>

To focus on one example, it is interesting to see how Krupp developed a trademark for his corporation. In the early 1820s it was still merely the name “*Fried. Krupp*” which should stand as a guarantee for high quality steel and innovative procedures in fabricating steel.<sup>78</sup> Since the introduction of the “Reichsgesetz über Markenschutz” in 1874, the first real trademark law, there were first reflections over a trademark at the Krupp plant. The first concept studies were: a shell with two flashes of lightning, a half winged railroad tyre, pictures of a steam hammer and the tower of the big steam hammer „Fritz“, and a stylised sign of three rings. Alfred Krupp himself chose the last design – a stylisation of the seamless railroad tyre – a famous invention of Krupp. The graphic was the most stylised and abstract symbol, which presented an ornament-less, clear and precise aesthetic. It is also a symbol of perfection, merely through the number three which symbolise the divine trinity. The peaky form of a pyramid also reflects a divine element. Although the three rings are not intertwined,

they evoke the illusion of close connection and proximity to the observer. This could be – according to Wolbring – an allusion on the idea of the enterprise as a trustworthy social institution. The logo was registered in 57 countries all over the world and it became nearly a metonym for the firm.<sup>79</sup>

### **b) Rheinmetall as a follower in corporate imagery**

The important weapons manufacturer Rheinmetall (formerly Rheinische Metallwaren- und Maschinenfabrik Akt.-Ges.) was founded in 1889 by the ingenious engineer Heinrich Ehrhardt. He built his plant at Düsseldorf near the large capitals of the iron- and steel-industry. Two years later Ehrhardt developed a famous procedure innovation, which allows to produce seamless pipes, tubes and ammunition. In 1892 this innovation was used for adverts – and with this innovation a still intact logo and trademark for Rheinmetall was created. It symbolises a metallic square block in a round press form. A rhombus symbolises the cross-section of the steel block and a ring form the cylindrical matrix. But in contrast to the Krupp cannons the logo of Rheinmetall never became a national symbol or monument.

Even after the merger of Rheinmetall and Borsig into Rheinmetall-Borsig AG in 1936 the firm still remained an important centre of German weapon production. The logo of Rheinmetall as well as the products, were well-known in the military sector. Because of the close relationship to the Nazi Government and the military strategies of the Nazi System at the end of World War II a production ban was imposed by the military government. The financial, material and political recovery process of the company lasted into the 1960s.<sup>80</sup> The start-up at the Düsseldorf plant of the Rheinmetall GmbH, the most important subsidiary company of the Rheinmetall AG, in 1950 began with non-military products. But these products were only of limited economic success. In 1956 a new post-war era began for the firm: the Röchling Group acquired the majority stake in Rheinmetall-Borsig AG, and sold the Borsig AG to the Salzgitter AG. An important step in renewing the plant was the resumption of defence equipment production at Rheinmetall Düsseldorf in the same year. The first military product was the machine gun MG 42. Despite the beginning of diversification into mechanical engineering and electronics in 1958, the firm quickly re-acquired its core business in 1964: the production of cannon tube and mount manufacture. These products have remained a very important source of financial success of the firm. Several advertisements for these products were developed and presented in different means of mass media such as newspapers (“Süddeutsche”, “Stern”, “Spiegel”), professional, technical and military journals (“Soldat + Technik”, “Kampftruppen”, “Armada”, “Internationale Wehrrevue”), film

presentations, brochures, leaflets and later on even TV-contributions. An important step towards a self-contained media policy was the founding of the “Rheinmetall Industriewerbung GmbH” (riw, Düsseldorf) as a subsidiary of the Rheinmetall GmbH in 1972. This subsidiary was organised as a profit-centre and worked in the fields of advertising, media research and public-relations for Rheinmetall, other companies (Vickers, Oto Melara, Röchling-Bank) and conservative lobby groups until its re-integration in the Rheinmetall GmbH in 1984.<sup>81</sup>

In 1979 the Rheinmetall AG founded a competitive staff department for public relations, which developed several comprehensive concept-studies for the Rheinmetall-Holding in order to advance the public image of the defence sector. It seems to me quite astonishing that the Rheinmetall AG reacted very sensitive and nervous to the challenges of the peace movement in Germany. A large number of public relation means were developed and financed by Rheinmetall since 1979, including internal and external instruments such as an “open house”-policy, staff-newspapers, writing courses for pupils and students of school and university newspapers. Even the peace movement and international research institutes for peace and conflict studies were carefully observed by Rheinmetall.<sup>82</sup>

Different adverts and campaigns were developed by the riw and the staff department for public relations. Although they changed regarding formal, aesthetic and linguistic aspects during the Cold War some themes and images remained stable. A main discourse during the whole period was “security” with its different aspects. In newspapers, journals and other campaigns Rheinmetall exploited the security-topic in several variations: security of peace, security of freedom, the security of the social market economy as a fundamental resource for everyone’s well-being. Rheinmetall proclaims itself as producer and defender of the public security. “For your Security – Now and in the Future” – this was the title of an advert for the MG 42 in the 1970s. “Secure weapon systems for a secure peace” – this abbreviation sums up the dogma of the company. The main intention of this connection of weapons with peace was to stabilize an image of peace in which weapons are indispensable. Rheinmetall itself substantiates the effort as follows:

“Wehrtechnische Anzeigen wozu? Diese Frage stellt sich berechtigt für den, der an Produktwerbung denkt. Mit der Hardware produziert die wehrtechnische Industrie nicht nur Spitzentechnologie, sie produziert Sicherheit. Mit den aktuellen Wehrtechnik-Anzeigen will Rheinmetall auf diesen Zusammenhang hinweisen: Wer JA sagt zur Bundeswehr, wird auch die Wehr-Industrie nicht zur Disposition stellen können. Diesen Zusammengang hat deutlich

zu machen, wer die Grundlagen unserer Sicherheitspolitik sinnvoll diskutieren will. Die Rheinmetall-Anzeigen sollen hierfür als Denkanstoß dienen.”<sup>83</sup>

It is quite interesting to see, that other producers like the family owned company Diehl also stressed the security-theme. In the 1980s they launched a campaign “Experience and Responsibility in Defence Technology”. Here, the company promised the public that they stand for the “security of freedom”, “security of justice” and that they provided “protection from aggression”. The conclusion of the advert was: “DIEHL produces Security!”<sup>84</sup> This advertising campaign was researched thoroughly in 1984 by one of the communication consultants of Rheinmetall and compared with other publications of Rheinmetall, MBB and BAD (British Aerospace Dynamics Group).<sup>85</sup> Psychological, linguistic, technical, visual and semantic questions were discussed in this study which was based on a market survey. One conclusion of the study was that the defence producers should avoid problematic photographs, that they should use a sober, clear and calm appearance and that they should appeal to contractors as well as to the public opinion. Concerning the last point, the consultant believed the advertising campaign of Rheinmetall to be the most convincing. But he suggested shortening the phrases in the adverts to prevent the observer from dissociation.<sup>86</sup>

Starting with the security-campaigns in the 1970s, Rheinmetall nearly stopped another form of weapon representation: history marketing. Between 1964 and 1968 Rheinmetall emphasized continuity and advertised historical photographs together with their new models. Slogans presented in adverts were „Fortschritt durch Erfahrung“ [Progress through Experience], “Bewährtes verbessert” [Proven Products – now Improved] and “Jede zu Ihrer Zeit die Modernste! RHEINMETALL-Waffen” [Each One the Most Modern Weapon of its Time! RHEINMETALL-Weapons].

In the late 1970s Rheinmetall introduced new series which stressed another important theme of the time: “Security in the Treaty - NATO means Security”. The NATO theme was further developed and created an image of trust and support in an international team. Rheinmetall presented itself as a “Partner von Bundeswehr und Bündnis” – a trustworthy, reliable company. This reflected not only the uplift of the NATO in the Cold War, but also new sales markets for the company. In 1978 the mass production of the weapon system FH 155 was introduced as a trilateral NATO-project. The FRG, Italy and Great-Britain were the main-contractors and Rheinmetall was one of the most important contributors.

Another important step to become a main weapon contractor of the German Bundeswehr was the delivery of the first Leopard 2 battle tank along with the 120-mm smooth-bore cannon and the matching ammunition in 1979. Rheinmetall showed its pride of this important

“technological innovation from Rheinmetall”. The Leopard tank became famous for its high quality to the public and to armies all over the world. It’s a well-known synonym for the good and high-technology equipment of the German Bundeswehr. The name “Leopard” combines the capabilities of the strong, smart and quick animal with the performance of the German army.

In times of the policy of *détente* it was Rheinmetall which in the late 1970s already began with a thorough restructuring of non-military sectors. In 1981 a big paper producing company, Jagenberg, and in 1986 an automotive company, Pierburg, enlarged the Rheinmetall AG. In 1989 after the end of the East-West-confrontation the corporate strategy was redefined along with deeper diversification into non-military industrial products.

In the 1990s Rheinmetall changed its logo into a new modernised form. It shows the stylised letter “r” in white and blue colours. There are still open questions on the change of the logo, but the new one leaves more variations of interpretation. It stands for a “financially strong, internationally successful player in the markets for automotive components and defence equipment”, a more diversified enterprise than before it was restructured after World War II. Although the logo shows a more open image of Rheinmetall, it is possible to interpret it as a gun barrel or as tank artillery. This reflects the high importance of the Defence sector at Rheinmetall with its divisions Land Systems, Weapon and Ammunition, Air Defence Systems, and Defence Electronics. The firm names itself “Europe's leading supplier and foremost specialist in the market for land forces equipment”.<sup>87</sup> To have a little outlook at the present advertising campaigns for the mentioned products it is interesting to see that Rheinmetall changed its appearance in the journals of arms technique, but also in the German and international high quality press.<sup>88</sup> As with the “Leopard” after World War II nowadays most of the produced weapons or arms systems are given natural names which become a quality brand in the weapon market. For the Land Systems there are animal names and brands like “Büffel” (recovery tank), “Fuchs” (tracker tank) and “Wiesel” (light armoured vehicle), for the Navy Systems there are no such brands but the advert shows a “White Shark” with the Slogan “It’s good to have a reliable navy!”.<sup>89</sup> All new adverts use analogies and images of animals for the weapon systems instead of technological details or direct arguments of quality and competence. The analogies in the new non-conformistic advertising campaigns are not composed by a highly specialised advertising agency, but by two young trainees at the advertising office of STN Atlas Elektronik GmbH in Bremen, which belongs to the Rheinmetall-DeTec-Gruppe. More than thirteen different adverts are yet presented, which shows the astonishing relevance of this campaign.<sup>90</sup>

Concerning the creation of a Corporate Image it is interesting to observe that since the aftermath of World War II with brands like the “Leopard” the nature theme remains important for arms producers like Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei. Nowadays the marketing strategies reach beyond this sophisticated branding with the above mentioned adverts in technical and newspaper journals. They still use natural topics of the animal world, but in addition to the older branding form they use special analogies for adverts. The analogies are easily to understand and have – like the brands – a transnational or global character.

In linguistic terms – if we understand texts “as a form of social practice”<sup>91</sup> - one can speak of camouflage and a special form of “framing”, because all products are presented in a natural “frame”.<sup>92</sup> I’m not sure if one can already speak of conceptual metaphors, possibly in the case of the “Leopard”.<sup>93</sup> Certainly all mentioned animals are well-known not only in Germany but also in many other countries, so one can speak of a transnational metaphor in case of the “Leopard”. And it even seems to be clear that within the natural frame it is possible for the observers of the campaign all around the world to create a sense of the weapon systems for himself or herself (the weapon systems as “defender of security”, as “smart and quick animals”, as “reliable friends”). Thus the complexity and high-technology character of modern weapon systems is reduced to schemes of peoples everyday life, which leads to a transcultural acceptance and a sort of “domestication”.<sup>94</sup>

Although other European producers like BAD used animal brands (“Sea Urchin” - Seeigel) too, they renounced images of peace, trust and well-being. In the 1980s the British BAD-group released a campaign called “Sea Urchin – The deadly Answer”. They promised that this mine showed a “massive potential of deterrence”. This potential was even visualized in the advert: a large-sized picture with a huge explosion on the sea presented the deadly effect of the weapon.<sup>95</sup>

Altogether I think it is yet to soon to come to a final conclusion about the different cultural perspectives and visual cultures, which are inherent of the presented marketing or advertising strategies. Further research on other European weapon producers is urgently needed. Maybe the sociological and linguistic theories on questions like memory, framing and discourses can bring more (theoretical and methodological) light into the recent discussion.<sup>96</sup>

This would be very useful for further research on the creation of weapons and weapon systems as symbols or national symbols. As Reinhardt has pointed out in his detailed study on the history of advertising in Germany, nationalistic arguments or stereotypes have been used nearly from the beginning. There certainly is a development in nationalistic crises, but the national card was played continuously over time and industrial sectors/branches.<sup>97</sup> In the case

of arms producers it still has not been researched in which way the products of firms like Krupp, Rheinmetall or others became symbols of national interest. Even the use of military force as images in the Cold War haven't been studied in depth.<sup>98</sup>

For Rheinmetall it is surely the "Leopard"-tank which is internationally known as a German superior high-technology weapon. In military circles it is a symbol for the military and economical recovery of Germany after World War II. Like military airplanes such as the "Jäger" and the "Phantom", the "Leopard" developed in a specific form to national symbols. To clear up the role of the expositions and the mass media further research has to be done in the difficult field of public reception. This is true for many well-known products of Krupp too. There are several stereotypes which transcend the German national character into the sphere of the Krupp products like "Hart wie Kruppstahl". Important products like the cannons "Tausendpfünder" and "Dicke Bertha" or the artillery "Siegfriedgeschütz", "42cm-Mörser" and "Parisgeschütz" also became symbols for the German nation as a whole. On the one hand, these products showed the hegemonial and expansive approach of Germany. On the other hand they reflected the modern, technological innovative and patriotic image of Krupp. If they reached the status of a transnational and world-wide icon like the "mushroom clouds" for the atomic threat, have to be resolved by further research.<sup>99</sup>

#### **4. Conclusion**

The case studies demonstrated different aspects of the Corporate Image-theme. In many regards Krupp was a pioneer in the field of strategic image-creation. Public relations, advertising, expositions, fairs, influence on the mass media and other instruments were developed and adopted by Krupp very early. With these instruments an ambivalent and differentiated image has been built up. On the one hand the image refers to basic economic values like quality, solidity, technical perfectionism, innovative power, and modernity. On the other hand it stresses more political or social values of the time like patriotism, nationalism, hegemony, superiority, struggle for (both economical and political) power, force, militarism, trust, order, social cohesion, responsibility for workers and clients, and virility.

As Wolbring has carefully shown over a long period the patriotic argument remained an important argument for the national arms market, for the consumers of Krupp and for the German public. Despite many neglected aspects of the Rheinmetall advertising history it became clear, that Rheinmetall like other producer of weapons created a special image of its products too. In the Rheinmetall-case my thesis of framing underlines the research on the cultural field of discourses. Rheinmetall used and still uses natural and domestic frames to

transport an attractive and familiar image of the produced weapons and weapon systems. The often used animal-theme creates an image of security, trust and well-being, although the produced goods are of a completely different, technological character. Similar uses of advertising and marketing strategies is made with the ILA as a public event, which transports very similar images of the basically different markets of civilian and military aerospace.

## Notes

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12. *Feldkirchen, Eisen- und Stahlindustrie, Anhang; WA Krupp Bestand 4*. Detailed for the 1970s and 1980s see Hummel, *Rüstungsexportbeschränkungen*, 289-305.
13. Peter used in his regional study of the World War II war economy a wide definition of “Rüstungsbetriebe”, which include all kind of enterprises which are defined by nazi government and military offices as “Rüstungsbetriebe”. Because of the totalitarian character of World War II there is a huge number of arms enterprises according to this definition. See Roland Peter, *Rüstungspolitik in Baden. Kriegswirtschaft und Arbeitseinsatz in einer Grenzregion im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, München 1995, 6.
14. See Stefanie van de Kerkhof, *Der “Military-Industrial Complex” in den USA*, in: *JWG* 1999/1: 103-134 and Walter Wittmann, *Rüstungswirtschaft II: Militärausgaben*, in: *Handwörterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (HdWW)*, Vol. 6, Stuttgart 1981, 513-522; Lutz Köllner, *Militär und Finanzen. Zur Finanzgeschichte und Finanzsoziologie von Militärausgaben in Deutschland*, München 1982; Norbert Zdwomyslaw, *Wirtschaft, Krise und Rüstung. Die Militärausgaben in ihrer wirtschaftlichen und wirtschaftspolitischen Bedeutung in Deutschland von der Reichsgründung bis zur Gegenwart*, Bremen 1985; Walter Wittmann, *Militärausgaben und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung*, in: *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft* 122 (1966): 109-129.
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34. Wolbring, Krupp, 84-86, 122ff., quotation 86.
35. Wolbring, Krupp, 86-90; *Art. Industrieausstellungen*, in: *Deutsches Staatswörterbuch*, Vol. 5, 314f.; Krasny, *Zukunft ohne Ende – das Unternehmen Weltausstellung*; Hettling/Nolte, *Bürgerliche Feste als symbolische Politik*.
36. Wolbring, Krupp, 84f., 90ff.
37. Heppe, *Industrie- und Gewerbe-Ausstellung*, 109f. Also G. Stoffers (Ed.), *Die Industrie- und Gewerbeausstellung für Rheinland, Westfalen und benachbarte Bezirke, verbunden mit einer Deutsch-Nationalen Kunstaussstellung*, Düsseldorf 1903.

38. Wolbring, Krupp, 90ff. and the booklet from Krupp for the exposition at Munich.
39. Allwood, *The Great Exhibitions*, 1977; Kroker, Plum and Haltern; Eckhard Fuchs (Ed.), *Weltausstellungen im 19. Jahrhundert*, Leipzig 1999; Martin Wörner, *Vergnügung und Belehrung. Volkskultur auf den Weltausstellungen 1851-1900*, Münster 1999; Christoph Cornelissen, *Die politische und kulturelle Repräsentation des Deutschen Reiches auf den Weltausstellungen des 19. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 52 (2001): 148-161.
40. Cornelissen, *Repräsentation*.
41. Winfried Kretschmer, *Geschichte der Weltausstellungen*, Frankfurt/New York 1999; Evelyn Kroker, *Die Weltausstellungen im 19. Jahrhundert. Industrieller Leistungsnachweis, Konkurrenzverhalten und Kommunikationsfunktion unter Berücksichtigung des Ruhrgebietes zwischen 1851 und 1880*, Göttingen 1975.
42. Wolbring, Krupp, 145.
43. Quoted after Wolbring, Krupp, 96f.
44. Haltern, *Die Londoner Weltausstellung von 1851*, 201. Wolbring, Krupp, 13f., 145.
45. Wengenroth, in: Vondran (Ed.), *Stahl und Weltausstellungen* and Wolbring, Krupp, 121f.
46. Bruno Tietz, *Für jeden Besucher das passende Angebot – Aus allgemeinen Messen werden Themenmesse*, in: Georg Küffner/Joachim Mortsiefer (Ed.), *Messen als Bestandteil des betrieblichen Marketings*, Frankfurt a.M. 1990, 89-102. It is rather difficult to differentiate between “fairs” for directs consumers and “exhibitions” for the information of a wider public. Mostly the national and international exposition were used in both directions. Therefore I sometimes use the terms synonymous.
47. Stefan Gose, *ILA 2000: Öffentlichkeit bezahlt zweitklassige Rüstungsmesse*, in: *ami 6/00*: 21-25: 24.
48. *Ibid.*, 21.
49. Claus H. Boerner, *Aktiv als Veranstalter oder ideeller Träger – Die Rolle der Verbände bei Messen und Ausstellungen*, in: Georg Küffner/Joachim Mortsiefer (Ed.), *Messen als Bestandteil des betrieblichen Marketings*, Frankfurt a.M. 1990, 133-144, 135.
50. Stefan Gose, in: *ami 6/00*: 21-25: 21; Christopher Steinmetz, *ILA: Brandenburger Erdnüsse*, in: *ami 6/02*: 3f. and Nina Odenwälder, *ILA 1998: Auch eine Rüstungsmesse*, in: *ami 7/98*: 23f.; *Handelsblatt* 19.5.1998.
51. Odenwälder, *ILA 1998*, 23.
52. *Ibid.* and *taz* 25.5.1998.
53. Odenwälder, *ILA 1998* and *taz* 19.5.1998.

54. Gose, ILA 2000, 21.
55. Odenwälder, ILA 1998 and FAZ 19.5.1998.
56. Odenwälder, ILA 1998 and Handelsblatt 19.5.1998.
57. See also Alexander Schug, *History Marketing*, Bielefeld 2003.
58. In detail Wolbring, Krupp; Gall, *Der Aufstieg*; Gall (Ed.), Krupp; Tenfelde, *Bilder von Krupp*.
59. Simone Derix, *Gruppenbild mit Industrielandschaft: Wie Krupp die Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei Staatsbesuchen bebilderte*, in: Johannes Paulmann (Ed.), *Auswärtige Repräsentationen. Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945*, Köln e.a. 2005, 165-184.; Wolbring, Krupp; Tenfelde, *Bilder von Krupp*.
60. Krupp, "Die beiden [Kanonen] dürfen nicht als im Kampf begriffen dargestellt werden, sondern als zufällig nebeneinander aufgestellt." Wolbring, Krupp, 126-138, citation 134 after FAH 2 M 78.9, fol. 108.
61. Rheinmetall-Archiv B 503/13.
62. Politisches Archiv Auswärtiges Amt (PA AA) B 57 III A 4.
63. Broszka, *Rüstungsexportpolitik*; William H. Mott, *United States military assistance: an empirical perspective*, Westport 2002; Mott, *Soviet military assistance: an empirical perspective*, Westport 2001; Peter Karmann, *Militärhilfe der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Afrika*, München 1988; Jürgen Schäfer, *Deutsche Militärhilfe an Südamerika*, Düsseldorf 1974; Ulrich Albrecht, *Deutsche Waffen für die Dritte Welt*, Reinbek 1972; Helga Haftendorn, *Militärhilfe und Rüstungsexporte der BRD*, Düsseldorf 1971.
64. Dirk Reinhardt, *Von der Reklame zum Marketing. Geschichte der Wirtschaftswerbung in Deutschland*, Berlin 1993, 24; Fritz Blaich, *Absatzstrategien*, 1982, 12-30, esp. 16. Kocka, 1977, 273.
65. Wolbring, Krupp, 146-155. She quoted FAH Krupp 2 M 78.7, p. 174.
66. Wolbring, Krupp, 149, 155, 169.
67. Wolbring, Krupp, 149. She quoted Wilhelm Berdrow (Ed.), *Alfred Krupps Briefe*, 129 and WA 3/2, 449f.
68. Alfred Krupp to his confidential clerk (Prokurist) Alberst Pieper, 27.11.1866, in: FAH Krupp 2 M 78.9, fol. 87ff. My source for this quotation is: Wolbring, Krupp, 158f.
69. Wolbring, Krupp, 158f. and 122f.; Zankl, *Public Relations*, 15; Meffert, *Marketing*, 493; Kunczik, *Geschichte der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit in Deutschland*. Kunczik argued against the thesis that the begin of PR in Germany is to fix after World War II with the influences of American marketing strategies.

70. Alfred Krupp an Carl Meyer 11.2.1862, HA Krupp WA VII f 1576, fol. 2f. und HA Krupp FAH II B 57, quoted as cited in: Reinhardt, Von der Reklame, 25. See also Wolbring, Krupp, 160-164.

71. Wolbring, Krupp, 160-164.

72. Rheinmetall-Archiv B595.

73. Reinhardt, Von der Reklame, p. 26; Mitteilungen des Vereins Deutscher Reklamefachleute 16 (1923): 256.

74. HA Krupp Handbuch 1906 und 1914; WA VII f 1576, fol. 5-7; WA IV 1800, Nr. 8, 9, 21; WA IV 1629; WA XI a1 65, quoted as cited in: Reinhardt, Von der Reklame, 26.

75. Reinhardt, Von der Reklame, 29f.

76. Ibid., 31-33.

77. HA Krupp Handbuch 1934; Bekanntmachungen 12 (1921): 125; Ibid. 16 (1925): 49, 53; WA VII f 1576, fol. 8; WA VII f 1316, quoted as cited in: Reinhardt, Von der Reklame, 33. Peter Borscheid, Am Anfang war das Wort; Ingenkamp, Werbung und Gesellschaft, 154ff.; Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, 248f.; Wolbring, Krupp, 122ff.; Homburg, Werbung.

78. Wolbring, Krupp, 144. Wolbring has exploited carefully material at the Historical Archive of Krupp: WA 4/743: Die Kruppsche Firmenbezeichnung und das Kruppsche Waarenzeichen 1808-1903. But she has not found any personal sources of Alfred Krupp concerning the logo.

79. In Germany, the logo was registered as a trademark of the Krupp Gußstahlfabrik in 1875 at the Königliche Kreisgericht Essen and in 1895 at the Kaiserliche Patentamt in Berlin. Wolbring, Krupp, 144f. A good source for the history of trademark-protection and the German legal actions is Elmar Wadle, Fabrikzeichenschutz und Markenrecht. Geschichte und Gestalt des deutschen Markenschutzes im 19. Jahrhundert, 2 Vol., Berlin 1977 and 1983, esp. 241ff. An example for the metonymous use of the logo: Gert von Klass, Die drei Ringe. Lebensgeschichte eines Industrieunternehmens, Tübingen 1953.

80. See Rheinmetall-Archiv A21/1ff.

81. Rheinmetall-Archiv B5307 and B521.

82. Rheinmetall-Archiv B 522/3 Marketingberichte Rheinmetall GmbH.

83. Rheinmetall-Archiv B521/1 Rheinmetall Wehrtechnik. Argumente für die Sicherheit. Rheinmetall-Insertionen als Diskussionsgrundlage.

84. Rheinmetall-Archiv B522/2 D.H. Unternehmenskommunikation. Qualitative Untersuchung einer ANZEIGEN-SERIE der RHEINMETALL GmbH – kommunikationspsychologischer Vergleich, 03/04 1984 and Armada No. 039 (1984).

85. Rheinmetall-Archiv B522/2 D.H. Unternehmenskommunikation. Qualitative Untersuchung and Internationale Wehrrevue 4 (1983): 439.
86. Rheinmetall-Archiv B522/2 D.H. Unternehmenskommunikation. Qualitative Untersuchung.
87. Rheinmetall-website 20.7.2005.
88. Rheinmetall AG spend in 2002 22 Mio. E, in 2003 19 Mio. and in 2004 12 Mio. for advertising means. Legal and Consulting costs sunk also in the last years: 51 Mio. in 2002, 43 Mio. in 2003 and 30 Mio. in 2004. Besides this there were provisions and other sales costs paid: 129 Mio. in 2002, 105 Mio. in 2003 and 88 Mio. in 2004. See Rheinmetall AG Geschäftsbericht 2003 and 2004, Konzernanhang Erläuterungen zur Konzern-Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung, Sonstige betriebliche Aufwendungen.
89. Das Profil: Die Zeitung des Rheinmetall-Konzerns 1/2002: 1.
90. Sebastian Reimann, Der „Weiße Hai“ als Werbestar, in: Das Profil, Die Zeitung des Rheinmetall-Konzerns 1/2002: 9. Advert „Der Weiße Hai“, back cover, 16.
91. Teun van Dijk (Ed.), *Discourse as Social Interaction*, London 1997; Andreas Reckwitz, Grundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken, in: *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 32,4 (2003): 282-301; Una Dirks, The de-/construction of war in the international opinion-leading press: The case of Iraq, in: José M. Bernardo/Guillermo López/Pelegri Sancho (Eds.), *Critical Discourse Analysis of the Mass Media*, Valencia (forthcoming).
92. The broader frame concept defined by Goffman and Minsky comprises not only structures of perception and lexical semantics, but also pragmatic contexts of experience. After Dirks "The cognitive and pragmatic features of a frame represent prototypical information, for example about its constitutive parts and functions, about its agents and sequences of action, i.e. its scripts. Whatever features are reified [sic!], they are related to each other through a complex hierarchical order." Dirks (2005), 21. See also Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, New York 1974 and Marvin Minsky, A framework for representing knowledge, in: Dieter Metzger (Ed.), *Frame conceptions and text understanding*, Berlin 1980, 1-25.
93. After Lakoff and Chilton/Schäffner metaphors apply one well-known field of knowledge with another. See Paul Chilton/Christina Schäffner, *Discourse and Politics*, in: van Dijk (1997), 206-230; George Lakoff/Mark Johnson, *Metaphors we live by*, Chicago 1980; George Lakoff, *The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor*, in: Andrew Ortony (Ed.), *Metaphor and Thought*, 2 Cambridge 1993, 202-251.
94. Dirks (2005), 14.
95. Rheinmetall-Archiv B522/2 D.H. Unternehmenskommunikation. Qualitative Untersuchung and Internationale Wehrrevue 6 (1983): 752: Advert for the Sea Urchin.
96. David A. Snow/Robert D. Benford, Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization, in: Bert Klandermans/Hanspeter Kriesi/Sidney Tarrow (Eds.), *From Structure to Action. International Social Movement Research*, Vol. 1, London 1988, 197-217; Robert Wuthnow, *Communities of Discourse. Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation*, the

Enlightenment, and European Socialism, Cambridge 1989; Robert Wuthnow, Introduction: New directions in the empirical study of cultural codes, in: Robert Wuthnow (Ed.), *Vocabularies of Public Life. Empirical Essays in Symbolic Structure*, London 1992.

97. Reinhardt, Von der Reklame.

98. There are first studies of Thorsten Loch, *Soldatenbilder*, Diss. Hamburg (forthcoming) and several studies of Gerhard Paul of war-images.

99. Gerhard Paul, "Mushroom Clouds". Entstehung, Struktur und Funktion einer Medienikone des 20. Jahrhunderts im interkulturellen Vergleich, in Paul (Ed.), *Visual History*, 243-264.